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3:AM: What made you become a philosopher?
Ernest	 Sosa: In my college years I was often intrigued by philosophical 
questions that my fellow students dismissed. At that point I had not come across 
“philosophy,” so named. Only right before my senior year did I find Bertrand 
Russell, which led to a year full of  philosophy (almost exclusively) at the University 
of  Miami, with Ramon Lemos as main professor, then two years of  graduate 
work at the ascendant University of  Pittsburgh, with Nicholas Rescher as main 
professor, followed by a year of  full time teaching at the University of  Western 
Ontario and a two-year postdoc at Brown, with Roderick Chisholm as mentor. 
(Short graduate careers were not unusual in those days of  enormous growth in 
higher education.)
I became and remained a philosopher because, through their writings, 
teaching, and discussion, brilliant people nourished and shared the philosophical 
curiosity that came so naturally to me.
3:AM: You’ve taken on epistemic skeptics who wonder whether we can know 
that this isn’t all a dream and so forth. You did so by putting forward your own 
theory of  epistemology—a virtue epistemology that you see as being in line with 
theories of  knowledge put forward by Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid and Descartes. 
Can you sketch for us what virtue epistemology is and in particular the distinction 
between animal and reflective knowledge? And is it a modern version of  Reid’s 
common sense approach—or Moore’s?
ES: I like the common sense approach of  Reid and Moore, methodologically 
and metaphysically. But the history of  astronomy soon made it irresistible that 
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common sense can be shown by science to be flatly wrong. Any defense of  
common sense must allow that it is revisable. Ultimately, my more significant 
agreement is with a virtue tradition that features Aristotle and Descartes.
Knowledge in my view is a form of  action. It involves endeavors to get it 
right, and more broadly it concerns aimings, which can be functional rather than 
intentional. Through our perceptual systems, we represent our surroundings, 
aiming to do so accurately, where the aiming is functional or teleological, rather than 
intentional. And the same goes for our functional beliefs. Through our judgments, 
however, we do intentionally, even consciously, attempt to get it right. What follows 
will focus on these epistemic intentional attempts, but the account to be sketched 
generalizes to the broader category of  aimings, which need not be intentional.
Attempts bring with them a distinctive normativity of  attempts as attempts. 
For example, success is better than failure; an attempt is a better attempt, it is 
better as an attempt, if  competent than if  incompetent; and it is better to succeed 
through competence—aptly—than through sheer luck. (Here I stipulate, for the 
sake of  a handy label, that an attempt is “apt” if, and only if, its success manifests 
the agent’s pertinent competence.) Here we have a telic normativity in contrast 
with the deontic normativity of  norms, obligations, permissions, and so on.
Attempts are found in domains of  human performance, such as sports, 
games, artistic domains, professional domains like medicine and the law, and so 
on. These feature distinctive aims, and corresponding competences. Archery, with 
its distinctive arrows and targets, divides into subdomains. Thus, competitive 
archery differs importantly from archery hunting. In competitive archery, risk 
assessment has minimal bearing on quality of  performance, since the archer has 
so little choice over shot selection. By contrast, in a hunt, shots vary in quality 
according to how well selected they may be.
Domains come thus in three sorts, distinguished by how their distinctive 
attempts are regulated by standards of  appropriate risk.
A domain can be entirely unregulated with respect to appropriate risk, so 
that participant agents need pay no heed to any such standards. Take doodling, 
or “aimless” ambling in a safe riverside meadow, or drifting in a canoe on a placid 
lake. Here standards of  risk are minimal or nonexistent. Normal adults can doodle, 
amble, and drift with no need to assess risk, since there is normally no risk at all. 
Jazz improvisation seems less subject to standards of  risk than surgery, and less 
than much formal athletic performance, as in a tennis match.
A domain can be risk-unregulated in a different way, when participants are not 
allowed attempt selection, or are tightly restricted, as in competition archery. When 
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it is an archer’s turn he must put himself  in position and shoot, with minimal, 
highly restricted attempt selection. At that point he must take aim and shoot. He 
has minimal or zero discretion with regard to the normal factors of  Situation 
(distance, light), or Shape (no option to wait til less tired, more alert, etc.), or Skill 
(can’t postpone so as to hone skill). And these are the SSS factors that determine 
degree of  complete competence.
The third category is of  domains risk-regulated to a significant extent, some 
highly so. Professional domains are examples here, reaching a peak in invasive 
surgery. Other examples are sports such as tennis and basketball.
The archery hunt is a borderline case. How is Diana’s shot selection regulated? 
This depends on whether the hunt is nearing its end, how many arrows are left 
in her quiver, and the like. A shot that she takes with the one arrow left to her 
may allow less risk than one taken when the quiver is full, especially if  the success 
of  the afternoon’s hunt depends on her success with that one remaining arrow. 
Hunt-internal factors determine appropriate risk in a way that would tend to elicit 
broad agreement among knowledgeable observers. Risk may be obviously too 
high when she is too far from her target, with just one arrow left, and when it is 
likely enough that better targets will soon be available within better range in the 
woods teeming with game.
A shot by Diana might be deft while poorly selected, an inferior shot in that 
respect—if  the prey is far, visibility poor, and the wind blowing hard, so that 
likelihood of  success is extremely low. Still her dexterity as an archer might deliver 
the success of  her shot, a highly skilled shot (in respect of  manual skill) despite 
being so poorly selected, so ill-judged (in respect of  risk assessment). Diana’s shot 
may thus attain first-order aptness through dexterity, without attaining “reflective” 
aptness full well. The latter requires aptness not only in hitting the target through 
manual competence, but also in attaining the aptness of  one’s shot, not only 
through dexterity but also through risk assessment.
Archery-external pragmatic values are here irrelevant, even when they do bear 
on the overall assessment of  a hunter’s archery shot. Thus, the success of  an 
archery shot may bring food to the hunter’s starving family, or may constitute a 
horrible murder. But these outcomes are irrelevant to the assessment of  that shot 
as a hunter-archery shot, as an attempt to hit prey without running excessive risk 
of  failure.
Accordingly, I leave open what value external to hunting-archery may reside 
in the fully apt success of  such an archery shot. I put aside even whatever value—
whether final or inherent or intrinsic—axiology might attribute to such archery 
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shots and to fully apt ones in particular. That is independent of  the normativity of  
hunting archery attempts as such attempts. The latter normativity is determined by 
the aims constitutive of  hunting archery attempts as such, both of  such attempts 
that aim merely at success, and also those that aim at apt success. If  a shot aimed at 
aptness succeeds aptly, it is then fully apt, since it is not only apt but also aptly apt.
But the full aptness of  such an attempt is entirely compatible with its being a 
horrible murder, if  the “hunter” is an assassin and the prey his victim. That hunter’s 
shot may still be outstandingly, fully apt, if  it manifests the agent’s competence in 
both archery dexterity and shot selection.
It remains only to make explicit the analogy of  archery to human cognition, 
which seems obvious once pointed out. We need only think of  a judgment that 
p as aimed at truth, as an attempt to get it right on the question whether p, by 
affirming that p (and by doing so aptly).
Dispositional judgmental belief  is then a state disposing you to judge 
affirmatively upon considering the question whether p. But this too is agential, 
and even an action, one extended temporally like the action of  those motionless 
human statues at tourist sites. It is a sustained policy that resides in the will. (That 
is how Descartes could propose that we give up all our judgmental beliefs in one 
fell swoop, by an act of  will. This is like giving up in one go all of  the policies that 
make one a safe driver, such as stopping at yellow lights and signaling one’s turns.)
3:AM: What makes it distinctive from rival theories of  knowledge? Are you 
still trying to answer Plato’s questions about knowledge—what knowledge is and 
what’s its value and is it that second question that adds interest to your work?
ES: Yes, my footnote to Plato has been focused on those questions. In my view 
there is a level of  human knowledge that involves just getting it right aptly. This 
“animal” epistemic level is an inferior level in just the way of  Diana’s long shot in 
the dark while drunk. That shot is inferior in a certain respect if  too poorly selected 
as a hunter’s archery shot, even if  not quite as poorly selected as would be a shot 
aimed at the moon. Even if  Diana’s too risky shot turns out to be apt by attaining 
success through sublime archery dexterity, it is still inferior in the particular respect 
of  being so risky and hence so poorly selected. So now what exactly is required for 
the superior “reflective” knowledge, and for “knowledge full well”?
First we must distinguish judging from guessing. Judgment is affirmation 
with the intention to thereby affirm competently enough, and indeed aptly. That 
distinguishes judgments from mere guesses. The quiz show contestant does 
endeavor to affirm correctly (and thus win the prize), while taking his affirmation 
to be a sheer guess, far from apt epistemic performance.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 3, n.º 2 (2016): 353-369
The Virtue Epistemologists. Interview with Ernest Sosa 357
A lucky contestant’s affirmation is thus “alethic.” It is aimed at truth alright, 
at getting it right. But it is still just a guess, not a judgment. In order to qualify as 
a judgment, an affirmation must aim at getting it right aptly, through competence, 
and not just through a lucky guess. Given its more substantial aim, a judgment is 
apt only if  its constitutive alethic affirmation is not only apt but aptly apt. The 
subject must attain aptly not only the truth of  his affirmation but also its aptness. 
And that in turn requires not only the proper operation of  one’s perception, 
memory, inference, etc., but also that one deploy such competences through 
competent epistemic risk assessment.
The analogy to Diana’s two levels of  assessable performance is exact.
However, spheres like the game show are devoid of  risk standards. An agent 
who endeavors in such a sphere can still aim to minimize risk, and also to keep 
risk below a certain level. But that would be a subjective choice, one made relative 
to whatever that agent happens to care about at that point, which will determine 
the relevant risks and rewards. Missing from such a case are any domain-inherent 
standards that determine whether risk is or is not above a threshold of  acceptability.
By contrast, take a tennis player barely ahead in a match, who starts hitting 
strokes at the top of  his power and as flat as possible, so that the risk of  balls 
going out is unacceptably high. Not unacceptably high relative to his objective 
of  scandalizing the fans. Rather, unacceptably high relative to the objective of  
winning the match.
A hunter archer can also be out to shock by taking crazy shots. What makes his 
shots “crazy” is set by excessive risk, judged by hunting-archery standards, which 
would tend to draw agreement from knowledgeable observers. I am thinking 
that hunting-archery is similar to tennis this way, if  much less formally. For one 
thing, there isn’t a formal definition of  success (as there is in tennis with winning 
the match). Archery hunts seem to fall into a family, depending variously on the 
prey hunted for, the size and organization of  the hunting party, the purpose of  
their hunt. Most similar to formalized athletics is hunting for sport. The fully 
apt hunting archery shot is then determined by how well the archer assesses risk 
relative to hunting archery, or to their specific sort of  archery hunt (whether for 
ducks, on foot, or for foxes, astride a galloping horse, etc.), and to the ends proper 
to such sport.
3:AM: So what do you mean by epistemic normativity?
ES: I mean an epistemic normativity of  judgments as attempts. Consider 
the part of  epistemology containing Plato’s questions as to the nature and value 
of  knowledge: the theory of  knowledge. This is associated with the problems 
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of  skepticism, of  whether and how we can ever attain knowledge. This part of  
epistemology is then concerned with the normativity of  judgments as attempts. 
Of  course, the domain of  these attempts is not the domain of  archery shots on 
physical targets. It is a domain of  intellectual shots, of  judgmental attempts to get 
it right on a given question, and to do so aptly.
3:AM: Isn’t a problem for this idea that suspending a belief  admits the same 
epistemic normativity as having the belief  itself ? How do you address this?
ES: This very pertinent question does raise a problem. But the problem has 
a solution, one that requires clarity on the fuller aim involved in many domains 
of  human performance. Go back to the important difference between Diana and 
the Olympic archer. For the huntress, selecting an appropriate target is of  crucial 
importance, and the quality of  a shot can vary in that specific respect: in how well 
selected it is. But her forbearing from shooting in a given instance, especially when 
tempted, may itself  be evaluated in line with our normativity of  attempts. The 
relevant normativity is hence not just one of  attempts as attempts. It is rather one 
of  attempts or forbearings.
Sometimes the right choice, in an archery hunt, is to forbear. But consider 
again factors external to the hunt: impressing someone, say, or getting some 
exercise, or relieving someone’s depression. None of  these has any bearing on the 
assessment of  that forbearance as a hunting-archery performance. Forbearances 
too are hunting-archery performances, and clearly assessable as such.
When the risk of  failure is too high, the right choice is to forbear. And here 
again it is important to distinguish the respect in which the choice is right. Again, 
the relevant normativity is here distinctive not just of  attempts but of  attempts 
and forbearings. One’s fuller objective is to make the attempt if  and only if  it 
would be apt. One must hence avoid inaptness and hence incompetence. But 
one does not avoid incompetence if  one makes an attempt whose likelihood of  
success is too low. This seems little more than analytic: when the performance is 
in a domain that imposes standards of  risk, attempts may or may not meet such 
standards. And the relevant competence of  agents then includes reliably enough 
meeting those standards. (None of  this applies, of  course, to instances of  free-
spirited, blasé choice, in an “unregulated” sphere, devoid of  any such standards.)
Suspending judgment is thus a special case of  forbearing from attempting. 
Accordingly, the normativity of  such attempt-forbearing has a special case in the 
normativity of  judgment-forbearing, that of  suspension of  judgment.
At agential junctures in a domain with distinctive aims and standards of  risk, 
one performs. Given an end in that domain, two options open up: aiming for that 
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end, or forbearing. The proper broader aim of  the performance is then to make 
an attempt if  and only it would be apt (and otherwise forbear).
The will here again has a role in epistemology. We saw earlier how judgmental 
beliefs are sustained policies to answer a whether question affirmatively, in pursuit 
of  truth and aptness of  affirmation. Now we find a different epistemic policy, that 
of  aiming to make alethic attempts if  and only if  they would be apt. There are 
then two ways of  violating this policy.
One might make an attempt when it is false that one would succeed reliably 
enough with such an attempt, so that the attempt is incompetent and hence not 
one that would be apt.
Alternatively: 
One might fail to make an attempt when one’s attempt would succeed reliably 
enough.
Either way one lowers the relevant quality of  one’s first order competence 
in that domain. Either the breadth or the reliability of  the competence is then 
reduced. Lowered reliability obviously yields a lesser competence. But lowered 
breadth does so as well. No doubt one’s competence would be superbly reliable 
if  one tried only on the rare occasions when the conditions easily assured success. 
One’s policy might be to shoot only when the target was a foot away. But this 
would be an unimpressive competence.
There’s a history to this approach. At an epistemic juncture, the Cartesian 
objective, one highlighted by my virtue epistemology, is that of  making an alethic 
attempt if  and only if  it would be apt. This is to be distinguished from the 
Jamesian objective of  attaining truth and avoiding falsehood. This is crucial to 
understanding Descartes’s epistemology as laid out in his Meditations and Principles. 
Thus, consider his account of  the “error” to be avoided. The distinction made in 
the following passages (translations by John Cottingham) is just that between apt 
and inapt judgment, but of  course Descartes’s project in the Meditations is to attain 
such aptness of  judgment, and to avoid error: that is, to avoid inaptness. So, his 
objective was not just the Jamesian objective. It was his own distinctively Cartesian 
objective (like one found also in Aristotle, as we shall see below).
If  “… I simply refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do not 
perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am 
behaving correctly and avoiding error [Latin error, French erreur]. But if  in such 
cases I either affirm or deny, then I am not using my free will correctly. If  I go for 
the alternative which is false, then obviously I shall be in error; if  I take the other 
side, then it is by … chance [French hasard] that I arrive at the truth, and I shall 
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still be at fault.… In this incorrect use of  free will may be found the privation 
which constitutes the essence of  error.” (Meditations, IV.12.)
It is also certain that when we assent to some piece of  reasoning when our 
perception of  it is lacking, then either we go wrong, or, if  we do stumble on the 
truth, it is by accident, so that we cannot be sure that we are not in error. (Principle 
44 of  the Principles of  Philosophy.)
In this respect, Descartes’s epistemology is a special case of  Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics (translations and glosses by Robert Bolton, unpublished).
It is possible to produce something that is grammatical either by chance or 
under the supervision of  another. To be proficient in grammar, then, one must 
both produce what is grammatical and produce it grammatically, that is, in accord 
with [kata=as an expression of] knowledge of  grammar in oneself  [not in some 
supervisor]. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II4, 1105a22-6)
This is in effect our concept of  aptness. How crucial such a concept is to 
Aristotle’s ethics may be seen in the following passage:
… human good proves to be an activity of  soul [a successful one, presumably, 
given the importance of  lucky externalities for Aristotelian flourishing] in accord 
with [kata=as an expression of] virtue and, if  there are more virtues than one, in 
accord with [kata=as an expression of] the best and most complete. (Nicomachean 
Ethics I 7, 1098a16-17)
Since human good is what humans ought to pursue, the pursuit of  interest 
to Aristotle is then such activity of  soul, that which constitutes human good, 
namely activity that attains desiderata, where the attainment is in accord with 
virtue. Aristotle is not in these passages so clearly and explicitly focused on the 
attainment of  human good. Famously, however, he does postulate that flourishing 
is properly the main human end, and flourishing is activity of  soul that succeeds 
in accord with virtue (spread over one’s lifetime).
3:AM: Do you categorise this as a type of  epistemological naturalism and if  so 
what are you ruling out on the one hand and ruling in on the other by doing that?
ES: Allow me to lead up to my answer by first delving into what sort of  risk 
assessment is relevant to aptness, and to epistemic aptness in particular. What 
determines whether risk of  failure in a given attempt is or is not too high? As 
suggested earlier, not every possible consequence that matters to those affected 
will bear on the relevant “risk.” The risk pertinent to a particular attempt (and to 
its evaluation as an attempt of  its sort) is the risk that the agent will fail to attain 
the end constitutive of  that attempt. This risk of  failure is coordinate with how 
likely or unlikely it may be that the agent will then succeed.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 3, n.º 2 (2016): 353-369
The Virtue Epistemologists. Interview with Ernest Sosa 361
The epistemic domain is a special case in which the relevant aim is getting 
it right on a given question, but only competently and indeed aptly. If  the agent 
aims to make the attempt if  and only if  it would be apt, then a distinctive element 
of  risk assessment becomes relevant: How probably would the agent succeed in 
attempting that fuller end?
In this interview I am mainly concerned with unqualified knowledge, by 
contrast with the varieties of  expert knowledge: scientific knowledge of  various 
sorts, legal knowledge, medically expert knowledge, and so on. When we speak of  
ordinary unqualified knowledge, my thought is that we are implicitly relativizing 
to the standards imposed by our evolution-derived humanity. These are standards 
that determine when we consider it appropriate to store beliefs just as a human 
being, rather than in one’s capacity as an expert of  one or another sort. Such 
stored beliefs are to be available for later use in one’s own thought or in testimony 
to others. We need some standard that will determine how likely a belief  is to 
be true given just that it is stored in one of  us, including strangers that one can 
ask for directions, and with whom one might collaborate. Important here is the 
ability to count on some at least minimal default level of  reliability even once the 
evidential basis for the stored belief  is long gone from memory. This assurance 
is important for our own later proper reliance on our stored beliefs, and for the 
reliance of  others on our testimony. The species-derived standard gives us a shared 
minimum. (This is akin to the proper ranges for volume of  voice and distance 
between humans in face to face communication. Even if  these are subject to 
cultural variation, they all lie within certain default humanity-wide standards. 
These “etiquette” standards are not formulable linguistically except trivially, and 
epistemic standards seem likewise implicit and inarticulable.)
3:AM: In your Locke Lectures you address two skeptical issues—dream 
skepticism and the question of  the criterion. Taking the first one first, what are 
the challenges of  dream skepticism?
ES: When you dream, your perceptual (and other) competence is affected. 
You are then unable to get it right competently with the beliefs in your dream. 
Consider now perceptual judgments made in your armchair some evening, while 
viewing a fire in your fireplace. It is thought that for all you know you might 
then be just dreaming that you see flickering flames, hear logs crackle, and feel 
warmth coming from a fire. In your dream, moreover, you might judge that you 
do perceive such a fire. And it is nearly always assumed that this judgment in 
your dream would be a real judgment. If  that is so, and if, in your condition, you 
are incompetent to tell whether you are perceiving or only dreaming that you 
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perceive, then here is your predicament: Even if  you are in fact perceiving the fire 
perfectly well, and judge accordingly, your judgment cannot be knowledge. Too 
easily might you have been dreaming, as you will be only minutes later. And so, the 
skeptic concludes triumphantly, you cannot then know that you face a fire, since 
you might so easily have been wrong in so judging.
3:AM: How do you push back?
ES: Virtue theory seems as vulnerable as the next epistemology to such 
skeptical attack. But it has more than one line of  defense. For one thing, it can 
resist the dream skeptic’s inference from ‘In his dream, S judges that p’ to ‘In reality, 
S judges that p, albeit while dreaming’. That is a response developed in some detail 
in those Locke Lectures (A Virtue Epistemology), and it seems available to other 
epistemologies, not just to virtue epistemology.
Another response is more distinctive of  the virtue approach. It likens the 
dream scenario to the notorious fake barns scenario (where your location is rife 
with mere façades). Arguably, if  you view a real barn in bright sunlight and close 
by, while fully alert and otherwise in good shape, then you do know whether or 
not you see a barn. You have “animal” knowledge, says my virtue theory, through 
the first-order aptness of  your judgment. You attain aptness by judging while 
in good shape and in a good situation (good light, good distance, etc.), through 
the exercise of  good barn-sorting epistemic competence. (Note, by the way, how 
naturally the term ‘good’ fits in the preceding sentence, and how obviously it 
relates to reliability.)
You do still lack another kind of  knowledge, however, namely “reflective 
knowledge full well.” This you lack because your risk assessment is not competent 
when you consider yourself  well enough situated to avoid the risk of  failure in 
the claim that you see a real barn. Your actual situation is adequate because in it 
appearance does match reality, and you have no sufficient reason to question the 
default assumption that it does so. But this match is too accidental (when the 
locale is rife with illusion) so that it is not competently taken to be present (not 
with the complete SSS-competence that requires of  the agent not only skill but 
also adequate shape and situation). Lacking such competence, one cannot know 
full well that one sees a real barn.
That same response is similarly effective against the dream skeptic. Even 
when you might very easily be dreaming, you can still know of  a facing fire 
through your multimodal perception of  it. When you are thus epistemically well 
situated and in good shape, your accurate judgment manifests relevant perceptual 
competence, and is hence apt, which makes it a case of  (animal) knowledge. All 
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the same, consider your good shape and situation (awake, alert, eyes open to an 
unobstructed view). Given how easily you might then be dreaming, such good 
shape and situation are too fragile to permit a competent enough assumption (a 
taking-for-granted) that they are reliably present. And this precludes knowledge 
full well that you face the blazing fire.
Virtue epistemology thus offers two distinct responses to the dream skeptic. 
Note, however, the important difference between them: the second protects only 
our animal knowledge, whereas the first protects not only our animal knowledge 
but also our knowledge full well.
3:AM: And how should we understand the question of  the criterion? What’s 
at stake?
ES: How can we know that we do enjoy so much as animal knowledge that p? 
In order to feel secure that we do, we must defeat the radical skeptic who puts it 
all in doubt. So an adequate response to the skeptical challenge is at stake.
Our bi-level animal/reflective approach allows the use of  basic foundational 
faculties in attaining a second-order assuring perspective. We can thus gain awareness 
of  those competences through whose exercise we attain our first-order knowledge.
This is the project that Descartes pursues in his Meditations by building his 
theological bulwark against the aggressive skeptic, through his faculties of  intuition 
and deduction. This leaves readers agape, as they wonder how so great a thinker 
could suppose that blatant question-begging would prompt anything but ridicule.
3:AM: And how does your approach solve the problem?
ES: The vicious circularity objection has been a mainstay of  skeptical thought 
from ancient times through recent journal issues. But what is the alternative to 
the virtue epistemological approach, as pursued for good example by Descartes? 
Should we demand an account of  our knowledge in general that lays out justifying 
reasons for every bit of  our knowledge, without circularity or infinite regress? No, 
it quickly becomes obvious that this is not only unfulfillable, but that it is obviously, 
necessarily unfulfillable, with metaphysical necessity. A further incoherence relates 
the knowledge that the aim is obviously impossible to the desire for its realization. 
These two attitudes do not cohere properly. One cannot coherently desire that p 
while knowing that it is obviously metaphysically impossible that p.
But we needn’t insist on the terminology of  “coherence.” The targeted 
combination is in any case bad. It is bad to want something that not even God 
could attain, especially when the impossibility becomes obvious. There is now a 
strong reason to try to escape that bad situation. But there’s not much to be done 
about the impossibility. One must instead get rid of  the desire.
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Once that is all clear enough, consider now the circularity that a successful 
account inevitably involves. A successful account enables us to understand human 
knowledge in general. Now, in coming to know our general account, we need 
to employ some subset of  our basic competences. Since general, however, that 
account must give us an understanding of  those very competences and their 
reliability. So, the competences by means of  which we come to know our account 
must be among the competences invoked in explaining how one would know 
any such account, and so they must be among the competences that our account 
claims to be reliable. There is no vice in this sort of  circularity.
Compare the circularity involved in coming to understand how our faculty 
of  vision gives us reliable access to our surroundings. In arriving at the relevant 
theory about the specifics of  our faculty of  vision we will presumably use our 
eyes to gather relevant data. Based on such data we come to know about the optic 
nerve, the structure of  our eyes, the rods and cones, etc., so as to explain how it is 
that vision gives us reliable access to the shapes and colors of  objects around us. 
In reliably arriving at that theory we thus exercise the very faculty whose reliability 
is explained by the theory. There is no vice in this sort of  circularity.
Briefly put: Suppose we wonder whether we should trust the deliverances of  
our basic epistemic competences. If  those are indeed our basic competences, then 
in order properly to satisfy our curiosity we will inevitably rely on one or more of  
them. So, either we squelch our curiosity or we will have to fall into the circularity 
or regress to which the skeptic objects. Since the actual infinite regress is of  reach 
for finite humans, we must fall into the circularity, the Cartesian sort of  circularity, 
wherein we use our fundamental faculties (intuition and deduction, as they might 
be) in order to attain a picture of  ourselves and the world around us (ourselves in 
the lap of  a benevolent omnipotence) that enables us to endorse our use of  those 
very faculties. There is no hope for a properly supportive perspective on our basic 
faculties that is not acquired by means of  such inquiry.
Finally, if  broadest science takes the place of  unaided theology, and our 
empirical faculties supplement the a priori faculties of  intuition and deduction, 
that gives us a better chance for a defensible perspective that can still play the sort 
of  role sought by Descartes.
3:AM: Along the way you talk about the role of  intuitions and what role they 
have in philosophy. Herman Cappelen has recently argued that intuitions play 
no role, Josh Knobe’s experimental philosophy crew warns that they can lead us 
astray, and some Kantians say the problem all stems from bad translations of  his 
First Critique—what do you say?
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ES: In my view, to deny that intuition has a place in the epistemology of  
philosophy is like denying that observation has a place in the epistemology of  the 
empirical sciences. Do experimenters make much use of  the word ‘observation’ or 
of  the concept of  observation? I doubt it. There is anyhow little need for them to 
do so. Of  course, they need to make observations of  various specific sorts. They 
must make observation reports too, as they record various instrument readings. 
But there is no need for the scientist to go into whether an observation was made, 
nor into the who, what, when, or where. The data on which scientific theorizing is 
based are rather the propositional contents of  the instrument readings recorded, 
or the facts detected thereby.
Analogously, philosophers need not much use the word ‘intuition’ or the 
concept of  intuition, except when they happen to be working on the epistemology 
of  the a priori. Philosophers do need to have intuitions of  various specific sorts: 
ethical, metaphysical, etc., depending on their targeted subject matter. And they 
must make intuition reports, as they record the contents of  their intuitions. But 
they need not go into whether an intuition has been enjoyed. The data on which 
philosophical theorizing is based are rather the intuited contents themselves, 
concerning the various thought experiments. At least that is so outside the 
epistemology of  the a priori.
When there are conflicts of  observation, when experiments cannot be 
replicated, scientists may then retreat to a study of  the various specific observations 
so as to explain the conflict, in the course of  which they would make use of  the 
concept of  observation, or of  some specification of  that concept.
Similarly, when there are ostensible conflicts of  intuition (or of  intuition with 
observation), philosophers may then retreat to an explicit study of  the various 
specific intuitions so as to explain the conflict, in the course of  which they would 
make use of  the concept of  intuition, or of  some specification of  this concept.
We can thus see why the concept of  intuition is more often used in 
philosophical theorizing than is the concept of  observation in scientific theorizing 
(proportionately). One reason is that there is (proportionately) more ostensible 
conflict of  philosophical intuitions than there is ostensible conflict of  scientific 
observations.
So much for the use of  a concept of  intuition in philosophical theorizing. But 
how is the phenomenon itself  best understood?
Here we need a distinction. Intuitive seeming is in my view an attraction 
to assent based on nothing more than understanding of  the content that upon 
consideration attracts one’s assent. But such understanding-based attraction can 
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differ dramatically in epistemic quality. Some such attractions represent nothing 
more than superstition or bias absorbed from the culture, sans ratiocination.
What makes an attitude just understanding-based is that there is no rational 
basis, no rationale that provides a sufficient motivational basis on which one holds 
that belief, not even indirectly via memory (so that one holds it indirectly for the 
reasons based on which it was initially acquired). This is what happens with much 
of  our common sense background knowledge, including general components of  
folk physics, psychology, and morality. These are “absorbed” from the culture, 
sans “ratiocination,” as Wittgenstein puts it in On Certainty. So, they are “intuitive” 
that way. All this means is that they have no sufficient rational basis. They are not 
acquired through reasoning that eventuates in the formation of  a specific belief. 
Rather, “light dawns gradually on the whole” of  Moorean common sense. These 
are not things taught in elementary school. Rather are we predisposed to acquire 
such beliefs by our brains, as a gift of  evolution, so that with a proper stream of  
experience we eventually emerge through infancy and childhood with such a body 
of  beliefs, some eventually made explicit at least partially, with increasing linguistic 
ability (which is also how we soon attain vast knowledge of  our mother tongue). 
Still, even once these absorbed beliefs are made explicit, it’s not as though we 
form them by rational reliance on specific perceptual or other evidence, properly 
so-called. This is not to say that experience has no causal influence on their 
formation. It is only to say rather that the process whereby these basic principles 
are acquired is not one of  rational argumentation whereby we rationally base a 
conclusion on certain premises adduced in its support.
The problem this raises is that much superstition and bias is also acquired thus 
without specific ratiocination. Such nonsense is also too often acquired through 
cultural absorption. So it can’t be the mere fact of  being thus acquired that provides 
proper epistemic status. True, that might provide some minimal “rational” status, 
as a basic commitment that survives deep reflection. But this is not enough to 
give it proper epistemic status, not fully enough, since someone deeply enough 
committed to such superstition or bias might sustain their nonsense even under 
conditions of  deep reflection.
Hence the absorption does give rise to intuitions, defined as seemings based 
on nothing more than understanding as far as rational basing is concerned. Such 
intuitions differ crucially from intuitions that are, let’s say, rational. These latter are 
distinguished by the fact that they are sufficiently reliable. So, the more specific 
way they are acquired and sustained is sufficiently reliable to constitute epistemic 
competence, and not just superstition or bias.
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That is in support of  an analogy between observation and intuition. Far from 
being exhausted, however, the topic is still much debated in books, articles, and 
symposia, and I myself  remain actively engaged.
3:AM: Tim Williamson’s approach to knowledge disconnected belief  from 
knowledge in a way—I wondered if  this poses challenges to your own approach?
ES: It is certainly a different approach, even if  we are in sympathy 
methodologically. Whether it is incompatible depends on its full content, and 
more specifically on what it means to say that knowledge is “first.” Is it first 
conceptually, so that we understand other epistemological concepts in terms of  
our concept of  knowledge? That I do find agreeable.
Here’s just one example of  how that might work. Take concepts such as 
justification or competence, and more specifically their epistemic variants. 
Suppose it is not possible to understand such epistemic concepts without appeal to 
knowledge. Perhaps “epistemic justification or competence” must be understood 
conceptually as just “the sort of  justification or competence that a belief  needs to 
manifest in order to qualify as knowledge.” If  we have a better understanding of  
knowledge than we do of  such justification or competence, then we can explain 
the latter through the former.
Epistemic competence might be thus posterior to knowledge conceptually, 
however, while still prior metaphysically. And this latter is what my view implies: 
that animal knowledge is metaphysically constituted by apt belief, by belief  whose 
correctness manifests the believer’s epistemic competence, a relevant disposition 
to get it right on the matter at hand when one tries to do so.
3:AM: How does your theory understand testimony? We all rely on testimony 
for most of  our beliefs and knowledge but where does responsibility lie for the 
normative requirements of  testimonial justification on your understanding—the 
individual or features of  the social relations between speakers and hearers?
ES: In my view (animal) knowledge is apt belief, where not only the belief  
(its existence and content) but also its correctness is creditable to the subject’s 
competence. The problem of  testimony for this view is that the correctness of  
much testimonially based belief  is no more than minimally creditable to the believer.
Take a beginning archer whose hand is guided by an expert. Is the success of  
his shot then creditable to the beginner? In order to answer this question we must 
know more. So far we cannot tell whether the success of  the shot is creditable at 
all, even partially, to the archer. It is of  course plausible that the existence of  the 
shot is thus creditable. The archer at least lends his hands and it is presumably 
up to him when exactly he lets go. So the existence of  that very shot is then 
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due to him at least in part. However, that leaves it wide open whether the shot’s 
success is also creditable to him, even partially. That will depend on the likes of  
this: Does he or does he not at all affect the arrow’s orientation at the moment 
of  release? Does he or does he not at all affect how far back the arrow is drawn 
at the moment of  release? Crucially, he might control whether and when the 
arrow leaves the bow, affecting thereby the existence of  the shot, without at all 
controlling either the tip/tail coordinates or the tension at the time of  release. 
That being so, he might plausibly determine the existence of  the shot without at 
all determining its accuracy.
Similarly for the case of  a recipient of  testimony. She too might contribute to 
the existence of  her belief, without contributing at all to its success, to its hitting 
the mark of  truth. But her belief  will be apt only if  she makes a contribution, 
however small, to her belief ’s correctness and not just to its existence. Compare 
the credit for a football touchdown, which might be shared by the receiver not 
only with the quarterback, but also with the linesmen who make crucial protective 
plays, etc. The success of  the touchdown play depends on the receiver, it is true; 
but in a particular case it might depend far more on the work of  others.
This I suggest as the right model for understanding how a belief  (a particular, 
token belief) might be apt even when its correctness is more creditable to the 
testifier, among others, than to the recipient. The success of  that belief, its hitting 
the mark of  truth, might after all be creditable in some measure to the recipient, 
which would suffice for his attainment of  partial credit. More would be required 
than just that the recipient contribute to the existence of  that belief. He must also 
in some way contribute to its correctness. For example, if  he had failed to be a 
careful enough listener and might too easily have misinterpreted the testifier, then 
he might still have been clearly responsible in part for the existence of  his belief, 
without being sufficiently responsible for its correctness.
When I accept someone’s testimony, I am thus only a small part of  the full seat 
of  epistemic competence, which might include many others in a long chain. My 
own contribution might then be slight, just through the perceptual and linguistic 
competence involved in knowing what someone is saying or writing, etc.
That is as concerns a knowledge that derives from the first-order default trust 
proper to rational, social animals. Defeaters can properly block the power of  such 
a source. Absent defeaters, however, we have not only the rational first-hand trust 
in the testimony of  a fellow human, but also the proper default trust that such 
trust is then in order, for a standing that goes beyond the first order and ascends 
to reflective endorsement.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 3, n.º 2 (2016): 353-369
The Virtue Epistemologists. Interview with Ernest Sosa 369
3:AM: I mentioned earlier experimental philosophy, but I wonder how 
important interdisciplinary work is to epistemology now—I’m thinking of  the 
work going on in neuroscience and psychology and philosophy of  mind too. How 
interdisciplinary is epistemology?
ES: Epistemology now flourishes with various complementary approaches. 
This includes formal epistemology, experimental philosophy, cognitive science and 
psychology, including relevant brain science, and other philosophical subfields, 
such as metaphysics, action theory, language, and mind. It is not as though all 
questions of  armchair, traditional epistemology are already settled conclusively, 
with unanimity or even consensus. We still need to reason our way together to 
a better view of  those issues. But that is compatible with the pursuit of  other 
approaches to questions alongside those we take up traditionally in seminars or 
armchairs. I expect and hope for continuing collaboration, combining the best 
results of  the best research along the various relevant lines of  approach.
This stance is in line with the earlier suggestion that we can pursue the Cartesian 
project without restricting ourselves to theology and a priori faculties. A better, 
broader perspective is properly sought if  we pursue the project with reliance on 
science broadly and on our full span of  epistemic competences, including the 
empirical as well as the a priori.
3:AM: And finally can you recommend five books to the readers here at 3:AM 
that will take us further into your philosophical world?
ES: My studies in college and graduate school included no epistemology, apart 
from historical texts like those of  Aristotle and Descartes. Only later, welcomed 
by Roderick Chisholm, did I enter the philosophical world well represented in 
Epistemology (Wiley), the large anthology edited by Fantl, Kim, McGrath, and Sosa.
In my long career I have learned so much from so many that there’s no hope 
of  selecting five without qualification. Anyhow, in my immediate neighborhood 
within that world, the following four approaches are notably similar to my own, 
though also dissimilarly dissimilar no less notably. Listed in temporal order:
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function
Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of  the Mind
Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.
John Greco, Achieving Knowledge
